Nevada Statutes
NEVADA REVISED STATUTES
TITLE 43--PUBLIC SAFETY; VEHICLES; WATERCRAFT
CHAPTER 483 DRIVERS' LICENSES; DRIVING SCHOOLS AND DRIVING INSTRUCTORS
MOTOR VEHICLE DRIVERS' LICENSES (UNIFORM ACT)
CANCELLATION, SUSPENSION AND REVOCATION
COPR. © 2005 The text of the Nevada Revised Statutes appearing in this database was produced from data provided by The Nevada Legislative Council Bureau and is subject to a claim of copyright by the State of Nevada.
Current through the 2005 Regular Session and 22nd Special Session of the 73rd Legislature
NRS 483.460 Mandatory revocation of license, permit or privilege to drive; period of revocation; tolling of period of revocation during imprisonment; eligibility for restricted license; action to carry out court's order.
1. Except as otherwise provided by specific statute, the Department shall revoke the license, permit or privilege of any driver upon receiving a record of his conviction of any of the following offenses, when that conviction has become final, and the driver is not eligible for a license, permit or privilege to drive for the period indicated:
(a) For a period of 3 years if the offense is:
(1) A violation of subsection 2 of NRS 484.377.
(2) A violation of NRS 484.379 that is punishable as a felony pursuant to NRS 484.3792.
(3) A violation of NRS 484.3795 or a homicide resulting from driving or being in actual physical control of a vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or a controlled substance or resulting from any other conduct prohibited by NRS 484.379, 484.3795 or 484.37955.
The period during which such a driver is not eligible for a license, permit or privilege to drive must be set aside during any period of imprisonment and the period of revocation must resume upon completion of the period of imprisonment or when the person is placed on residential confinement.
(b) For a period of 1 year if the offense is:
(1) Any other manslaughter, including vehicular manslaughter as described in NRS 484.3775, resulting from the driving of a motor vehicle or felony in the commission of which a motor vehicle is used, including the unlawful taking of a motor vehicle.
(2) Failure to stop and render aid as required pursuant to the laws of this State in the event of a motor vehicle accident resulting in the death or bodily injury of another.
(3) Perjury or the making of a false affidavit or statement under oath to the Department pursuant to NRS 483.010 to 483.630, inclusive, or pursuant to any other law relating to the ownership or driving of motor vehicles.
(4) Conviction, or forfeiture of bail not vacated, upon three charges of reckless driving committed within a period of 12 months.
(5) A violation of NRS 484.379 that is punishable pursuant to paragraph (b) of subsection 1 of NRS 484.3792 and the driver is not eligible for a restricted license during any of that period.
(6) A violation of NRS 484.348.
(c) For a period of 90 days, if the offense is a violation of NRS 484.379 that is punishable pursuant to paragraph (a) of subsection 1 of NRS 484.3792.
2. The Department shall revoke the license, permit or privilege of a driver convicted of violating NRS 484.379 who fails to complete the educational course on the use of alcohol and controlled substances within the time ordered by the court and shall add a period of 90 days during which the driver is not eligible for a license, permit or privilege to drive.
3. When the Department is notified by a court that a person who has been convicted of a violation of NRS 484.379 that is punishable pursuant to paragraph (a) of subsection 1 of NRS 484.3792 has been permitted to enter a program of treatment pursuant to NRS 484.37937, the Department shall reduce by one-half the period during which he is not eligible for a license, permit or privilege to drive, but shall restore that reduction in time if notified that he was not accepted for or failed to complete the treatment.
4. The Department shall revoke the license, permit or privilege to drive of a person who is required to install a device pursuant to NRS 484.3943 but who operates a motor vehicle without such a device:
(a) For 3 years, if it is his first such offense during the period of required use of the device.
(b) For 5 years, if it is his second such offense during the period of required use of the device.
5. A driver whose license, permit or privilege is revoked pursuant to subsection 4 is not eligible for a restricted license during the period set forth in paragraph (a) or (b) of that subsection, whichever applies.
6. In addition to any other requirements set forth by specific statute, if the Department is notified that a court has ordered the revocation, suspension or delay in the issuance of a license pursuant to title 5 of NRS, NRS 176.064 or 206.330, chapter 484 of NRS or any other provision of law, the Department shall take such actions as are necessary to carry out the court's order.
7. As used in this section, "device" has the meaning ascribed to it in NRS 484.3941.
[33:190:1941; A 1943, 268; 1947, 443; 1943 NCL § 4442.32]--(NRS A 1959, 287; 1969, 760, 761, 1508; 1971, 2030; 1973, 586; 1975, 787; 1981, 535, 1922; 1983, 1081; 1989, 1193, 1397, 1736; 1995, 741, 1156, 1165, 1361, 1372, 1917, 2401; 1997, 802, 1742, 2842, 2856, 3367; 1999, 474, 1384, 2135, 3409; 2001, 245, 246; 2003, 1154; 2005, 76, 132, 604)
<General Materials (GM) - References, Annotations, or Tables>
NOTES, REFERENCES, AND ANNOTATIONS
REVISER'S NOTE.
Ch. 193, Stats. 2005, which amended this section, contains the following provision not included in NRS:
"The amendatory provisions of this act apply to offenses committed before October 1, 2005, for the purpose of determining whether a person is subject to the provisions of subsection 2 of NRS 484.3792, as amended by this act, or subsection 1 of section 9 of this act [NRS 488.427]."
NEVADA CASES.
Upon existence of three factors, statute imposes mandatory duty to revoke license. In 1986, appellant was convicted for driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor (DUI). At trial district attorney did not introduce evidence of appellant's 1979 conviction for DUI based on the determination that the 1979 conviction was constitutionally insufficient because appellant was not represented by counsel during those proceedings. However, Justice Court officially notified the Department of Motor Vehicles and Public Safety (now the Department of Motor Vehicles) of appellant's 1979 and 1986 convictions. Based on two convictions, appellant's driver's license was revoked for 1 year. The court held that NRS 483.460 imposes upon the Department a mandatory duty to revoke a person's driver's license for 1 year upon the existence of three factors: (1) the Department must receive valid records of conviction; (2) these records must show that the person was convicted twice within 7 years for violating NRS 484.379 (DUI); and (3) convictions must be final. The court rejected appellant's contention that Justice Court's treatment of his second conviction as a first offense is binding on the Department in its license revocation proceedings. Yohey v. State, Dep't of Motor Vehicles & Public Safety, 103 Nev. 584, 747 P.2d 238 (1987), cited, State, Dep't of Motor Vehicles & Public Safety v. Hafen, 108 Nev. 1011, at 1013, 842 P.2d 725 (1992), State, Dep't of Motor Vehicles & Public Safety v. Madrigal, 110 Nev. 1005, at 1007, 879 P.2d 746 (1994), State, Dep't of Motor Vehicles & Public Safety v. Paul, 113 Nev. 481, at 483, 936 P.2d 834 (1997)
Department without discretion in revoking license. On appeal from an order of district court affirming revocation of appellant's driver's license, where Justice Court forwarded to the Department of Motor Vehicles and Public Safety (now the Department of Motor Vehicles) documents indicating that appellant had been convicted for driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor in 1979 and 1986, the court held that upon receipt of these records the Department was required to revoke appellant's driver's license for 1 year. Nothing in statute grants the Department, expressly or impliedly, any discretion in revoking a driver's license. Yohey v. State, Dep't of Motor Vehicles & Public Safety, 103 Nev. 584, 747 P.2d 238 (1987), cited, State, Dep't of Motor Vehicles & Public Safety v. Ortega, 107 Nev. 853, at 855, 821 P.2d 352 (1991)
Objective of administrative revocation of license. On appeal from an order of district court affirming revocation of appellant's driver's license, where Justice Court forwarded to the Department of Motor Vehicles and Public Safety (now the Department of Motor Vehicles) documents indicating that appellant had been convicted for driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor in 1979 and 1986, the court held that upon receipt of these records the Department was required to revoke appellant's driver's license for 1 year. The objective of administrative revocation of a driver's license under NRS 483.460 is not to impose additional punishment but to protect the unsuspecting public from irresponsible drivers. The court rejected appellant's contention that revocation of his license constituted enhancement of the penalty imposed pursuant to conviction. Yohey v. State, Dep't of Motor Vehicles & Public Safety, 103 Nev. 584, 747 P.2d 238 (1987), cited, State, Dep't of Motor Vehicles & Public Safety v. McLeod, 106 Nev. 852, at 854, 801 P.2d 1390 (1990), State, Dep't of Motor Vehicles & Public Safety v. Binder, 109 Nev. 945, at 949, 860 P.2d 163 (1993), State v. Lomas, 114 Nev. 313, at 317, 955 P.2d 678 (1998)
Revocation of license by Department not enhancement of penalty imposed by court. On appeal from an order of district court affirming revocation of appellant's driver's license, where Justice Court forwarded to the Department of Motor Vehicles and Public Safety (now the Department of Motor Vehicles) documents indicating that appellant had been convicted for driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor in 1979 and 1986, the court held that upon receipt of these records the Department was required by NRS 483.460 to revoke appellant's driver's license for 1 year. Appellant contended that revocation of his license constituted enhancement of the penalty imposed pursuant to conviction. The court held that revocation of a driver's license by the Department, rather than the court of conviction, is not enhancement of the penalty imposed by the court of conviction. Yohey v. State, Dep't of Motor Vehicles & Public Safety, 103 Nev. 584, 747 P.2d 238 (1987), cited, State v. Lomas, 114 Nev. 313, at 317, 955 P.2d 678 (1998), see also Desimone v. State, 116 Nev. 195, at 202, 996 P.2d 405 (2000)
Department not authorized to assess validity of prior convictions. In 1986, appellant was convicted for driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor (DUI). At trial the district attorney did not introduce evidence of appellant's 1979 conviction for DUI based on a determination that the 1979 conviction was constitutionally insufficient because appellant was not represented by counsel during those proceedings. However, Justice Court officially notified the Department of Motor Vehicles and Public Safety (now the Department of Motor Vehicles) of appellant's 1979 and 1986 convictions. Based on two convictions, appellant's driver's license was revoked for 1 year. The court held that NRS 483.460 neither obligates nor authorizes the Department to assess the validity of prior convictions. The court concluded that district court properly affirmed revocation of appellant's license. Yohey v. State, Dep't of Motor Vehicles & Public Safety, 103 Nev. 584, 747 P.2d 238 (1987)
Adjudication by juvenile court of driving under influence does not constitute conviction for purposes of section. Respondent, while a minor, was adjudicated by juvenile court to have operated a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. Respondent was subsequently convicted, as an adult, for a separate incident of driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor. The Department of Motor Vehicles and Public Safety (now the Department of Motor Vehicles), based upon the previous adjudication by juvenile court, determined the conviction to be respondent's second violation within 7 years and, therefore, revoked his driver's license for 1 year pursuant to NRS 483.460. The action of the Department was improper because: (1) juvenile adjudication is not a conviction for purposes of criminal law (see former NRS 62.216, cf. NRS 62.295); and (2) although "conviction" for purposes of the Uniform Motor Vehicle Drivers' License Act (see NRS 483.010, et seq.) includes a "finding" by juvenile court pursuant to NRS 62.221 (see NRS 483.450), such "finding" relates only to a minor traffic offense, and driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor is excluded from the definition of "minor traffic offense" pursuant to NRS 62.020. State, Dep't of Motor Vehicles & Public Safety v. Hafen, 108 Nev. 1011, 842 P.2d 725 (1992), cited, AGO 99-07 (2-24-1999)
Conviction under federal law for driving under influence did not support revocation of driver's license by Department. Conviction of appellant under federal law for driving under the influence of alcohol in Lake Mead Recreation Area did not support revocation of his driver's license by the Department of Motor Vehicles and Public Safety (now the Department of Motor Vehicles) pursuant to NRS 483.460, because appellant was not convicted of violating NRS 484.379. Krahn v. State, Dep't of Motor Vehicles & Public Safety, 108 Nev. 1015, 842 P.2d 728 (1992)
Imperfect performance of recordkeeping duties by minor functionaries of district court does not divest Department of jurisdiction to revoke driving privileges. Where the Department of Motor Vehicles and Public Safety (now the Department of Motor Vehicles) revoked respondent's driving privileges pursuant to NRS 483.460 after the Department received respondent's three records of conviction for driving while under the influence, district court erroneously reversed the Department's decision to revoke respondent's driving privileges where district court based its decision solely upon the fact that the records of conviction did not comply with provisions of NRS 483.450 in that one record of conviction did not contain respondent's vehicle registration number and the other record of conviction did not contain respondent's driver's license number. The Supreme Court held that the Legislature could not have intended that the mere imperfect performance of recordkeeping duties by minor functionaries should divest the Department of jurisdiction to revoke driving privileges. The purpose of NRS 483.450 is not to create substantive rights for drunk drivers but to promote a timely and uniform system of recordkeeping regarding convictions for drunk driving. Thus, the decision of district court was reversed and the matter was remanded with instructions to reinstate the Department's decision to revoke respondent's driving privileges. State, Dep't of Motor Vehicles & Public Safety v. Binder, 109 Nev. 945, 860 P.2d 163 (1993)
Collateral consequence provided by section for revocation of driver's license was not of sufficient significance to create substantial controversy and thereby prevent dismissal of appeal as moot. Where the period of revocation of appellant's driver's license had expired, the Supreme Court dismissed an appeal as moot and rejected appellant's argument that the Court should not dismiss the appeal because of the existence of the following collateral consequences: (1) payment of fees for reinstatement of the license (see NRS 483.410); (2) enhancement of the period of revocation for subsequent revocations of the license (see NRS 483.460); (3) loss of entitlement to a restricted license for subsequent revocations of license (see NRS 483.490); (4) taking the written and driving tests as a condition of reinstatement of the license (see NRS 483.495); and (5) filing proof of financial responsibility (see NRS 483.525). The Court concluded that none of these collateral consequences were of sufficient significance to create substantial controversy. Langston v. State, Dep't of Motor Vehicles & Public Safety, 110 Nev. 342, 871 P.2d 362 (1994), cited, Guinn v. Legislature, 119 Nev. 460, at 476, 76 P.3d 22 (2003)
Certified documentation from court of conviction of driving under influence is not required in order to revoke driver's license. The Department of Motor Vehicles and Public Safety (now the Department of Motor Vehicles), in accordance with NRS 483.460, revoked respondent's driver's license on the ground that the Department's records indicated that respondent had been convicted of violating NRS 484.379 (driving under the influence) twice within 7 years. Revocation was upheld by an administrative hearing officer, but was reversed by district court on the ground that documents presented at the administrative hearing as evidence of convictions were not properly certified copies of documents issuing from the courts of record, but were only certified copies of documents in the possession of the Department. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of district court and held that there is no requirement, statutory or otherwise, that the Department receive certified documentation of a person's convictions for driving under the influence from the courts in which the convictions were entered in order to revoke a person's driver's license. State, Dep't of Motor Vehicles & Public Safety v. Madrigal, 110 Nev. 1005, 879 P.2d 746 (1994)
Revocation of driver's license is based upon dates of violations within 7 years, not upon dates of resulting convictions. Revocation of a driver's license pursuant to NRS 483.460(1) is based upon the dates of the driver's violations of NRS 484.379 within 7 years, not upon the dates of the resulting convictions for violations. State, Dep't of Motor Vehicles & Public Safety v. Paul, 113 Nev. 481, 936 P.2d 834 (1997)
Administrative revocation of a driver's license does not constitute punishment for purposes of double jeopardy. Trial court determined that defendant could not be prosecuted for driving under the influence (see NRS 484.379 and 484.3795) because defendant already had been punished for the DUI offense by having his driver's license revoked for 90 days by the Department of Motor Vehicles and Public Safety (now the Department of Motor Vehicles). (See NRS 484.384 and 484.385.) Applying the two-part test from Hudson v. United States, 118 S.Ct. 488 (1997), the Supreme Court held that defendant could be prosecuted for the DUI offense because the earlier administrative revocation of his driver's license did not constitute punishment for purposes of double jeopardy. (See U.S. 5th amendment and Nev. Art. 1, § 8.) The Legislature clearly intended administrative proceedings relating to the revocation of a driver's license to be civil proceedings, not criminal proceedings. Furthermore, while administrative revocation of a driver's license may have certain punitive effects, such punitive effects are outweighed by the State's important nonpunitive goal of maintaining safety on public roads, and neither a minimum 90-day revocation (see NRS 484.384) or a maximum 5-year revocation (see NRS 483.460) is excessive in relation to that goal. Therefore, the earlier administrative revocation of defendant's driver's license did not constitute punishment because such revocation served a remedial or civil deterrent purpose, rather than a retributive or criminal purpose. State v. Lomas, 114 Nev. 313, 955 P.2d 678 (1998), cited, Desimone v. State, 116 Nev. 195, at 198, 996 P.2d 405 (2000)
FEDERAL AND OTHER CASES.
No right to trial by jury for driving under influence. Based on the severity of the maximum authorized penalty as a major criterion, there is no constitutional right to trial by jury for a person charged under Nevada law with driving under the influence of alcohol (see NRS 484.379) since: (1) with the maximum prison term being 6 months (see NRS 484.3792), a presumption exists that the Nevada Legislature views it as a "petty" offense for purposes of the U.S. 6th amendment (see also Nev. Art. 1, § 3 and NRS 266.550); and (2) defendant did not demonstrate that additional statutory penalties (see NRS 483.460, 484.3792 and 484.384) reflect a legislative determination that the offense in question is a "serious" one. Blanton v. City of N. Las Vegas, 109 S.Ct. 1289 (1989), cited, Westmoreland v. Demosthenes, 737 F. Supp. 1127, at 1129 (D. Nev. 1990), McLean v. Moran, 963 F.2d 1306, at 1311 (9th Cir. 1992)
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OPINIONS.
Sufficiency of record. The record of conviction of a licensee necessary, under sec. 33, ch. 190, Stats. 1941 (cf. NRS 483.460), to make it mandatory for the Motor Vehicle Department (now Department of Motor Vehicles) forthwith to revoke the license of a licensee can be nothing less than a written order, judgment and decree of the court, either signed by the judge himself, or copied from minutes of the court where the court is not the court of record. AGO 341M (7-16-1942)
Revocation of driver's license for conviction of driving under influence of intoxicating liquor is automatic under section. NCL §§ 4351 and 4442.32 (cf. NRS 484.3792 and 483.460) dealing with punishment for driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, should be considered together so far as they are consistent. Thus, a court has power to revoke a driver's license under NCL § 4351 (cf. NRS 484.3792), but a license is automatically revoked by NCL § 4442.32 (cf. NRS 483.460). AGO 256 (12-26-1945)
