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NEVADA REVISED STATUTES
TITLE 43--PUBLIC SAFETY; VEHICLES; WATERCRAFT
CHAPTER 484 TRAFFIC LAWS
RULES OF THE ROAD
AGGRESSIVE DRIVING; RECKLESS DRIVING; VEHICULAR MANSLAUGHTER

COPR. © 2005 The text of the Nevada Revised Statutes appearing in this

database was produced from data provided by The Nevada Legislative Council

Bureau and is subject to a claim of copyright by the State of Nevada.

Current through the 2005 Regular Session and 22nd Special Session
of the 73rd Legislature

NRS 484.377 Reckless driving; penalty for willful or wanton disregard for safety causing death or substantial bodily harm; additional penalties.

1. It is unlawful for a person to:

(a) Drive a vehicle in willful or wanton disregard of the safety of persons or property.

(b) Drive a vehicle in an unauthorized speed contest on a public highway.

A violation of this subsection or subsection 1 of NRS 484.348 constitutes reckless driving.

2. Unless a greater penalty is provided pursuant to subsection 4 of NRS 484.348, a person who does any act or neglects any duty imposed by law while driving or in actual physical control of any vehicle in willful or wanton disregard of the safety of persons or property, if the act or neglect of duty proximately causes the death of or substantial bodily harm to a person other than himself, is guilty of a category B felony and shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for a minimum term of not less than 1 year and a maximum term of not more than 6 years, or by a fine of not more than $5,000, or by both fine and imprisonment.

3. A person who violates any provision of this section may be subject to the additional penalty set forth in NRS 484.3667 unless the person is subject to the penalty provided pursuant to subsection 4 of NRS 484.348.

(Added to NRS by 1969, 1486; A 1981, 866; 1983, 1015; 1993, 524; 1995, 1298; 2003, 487, 3244)

Drivers' licenses, mandatory revocation or suspension, NRS 483.460, 483.461

NEVADA CASES.

Particular manner of driving need not be alleged in indictment or information charging violation of section. Under sec. 1, ch. 166, Stats. 1925 (cf. NRS 484.377), which makes it unlawful to drive in a reckless manner, the allegation in the information is sufficient allegation of one of the essential elements of offense if it charges that the vehicle was operated in a reckless and dangerous manner. The particular manner of driving which is charged as being reckless need not be stated in the information or indictment. State v. Mills, 52 Nev. 10, 279 Pac. 759 (1929), cited, Logan v. Warden, 86 Nev. 511, at 514, 471 P.2d 249 (1970)

Probable cause to believe section violated where driver crossed center line and collided with oncoming car. In habeas corpus proceeding, where petitioner was charged with involuntary manslaughter as a result of an automobile collision in which his automobile crossed the centerline in the twilight of dawn and collided with another vehicle proceeding in its own lane, defendant had to be held to answer under the preliminary examination statute, the provisions of former NRS 171.455 (cf. NRS 171.206), if it appeared that a public offense had been committed and there was sufficient cause to believe him guilty, and under the provisions of former NRS 484.127 (cf. NRS 484.305), making it a misdemeanor to drive a vehicle outside of the lane unless this can be done safely, and the provisions of former NRS 484.060 (cf. NRS 484.377), making it a misdemeanor to operate recklessly, the offense appeared without negation of possible justifying circumstances, because proof beyond a reasonable doubt is not required at this stage, and the examining magistrate is not required to distinguish degrees of negligence. In re Goldblatt, 74 Nev. 74, 322 P.2d 902 (1958), cited, In re Bennett, 77 Nev. 429, at 431, 366 P.2d 343 (1961), In re Beasley, 79 Nev. 78, at 81, 378 P.2d 524 (1963), Shelby v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 82 Nev. 204, at 208, 414 P.2d 942 (1966), Hanley v. State, 85 Nev. 154, at 156, 451 P.2d 852 (1969), Goldsmith v. Sheriff, Lyon County, 85 Nev. 295, at 302, 454 P.2d 86 (1969)

Investigation after stop of vehicle for violation of section reasonable. Where an automobile was stopped because of observable traffic offenses, including violation of NRS 482.275, relating to absence of license plates, the provisions of former NRS 484.060 (cf. NRS 484.377), relating to careless driving, and the provisions of former NRS 484.154 (cf. NRS 484.343), relating to changing lanes without signals, probable cause was established for such stopping, and where driver was found to be without a license, in violation of NRS 483.230, and could show no registration or report of dealer, pursuant to the provisions of former NRS 482.403 (cf. NRS 482.424 and 482.426), and where a radio report from police headquarters advised of a grand theft auto and burglary, the investigation following stopping was reasonable and established probable cause for felony arrests without a warrant. Harper v. State, 84 Nev. 233, 440 P.2d 893 (1968), cited, Robertson v. State, 84 Nev. 559, at 562, 445 P.2d 352 (1968), Gebert v. State, 85 Nev. 331, at 334, 454 P.2d 897 (1969), Sharkey v. State, 85 Nev. 574, at 575, 459 P.2d 769 (1969), Johnson v. State, 86 Nev. 52, at 54, 464 P.2d 465 (1970), Hughes v. State, 86 Nev. 584, at 586, 471 P.2d 245 (1970), Anderson v. State, 86 Nev. 829, at 834, 477 P.2d 595 (1970), Singleton v. State, 87 Nev. 53, at 54, 482 P.2d 288 (1971), Wright v. State, 88 Nev. 460, at 464, 499 P.2d 1216 (1972), Washington v. State, 94 Nev. 181, at 184, 576 P.2d 1126 (1978)

Unnecessary for trial court to define "speed contest" in prosecution under section. In prosecution of criminal defendant for involuntary manslaughter based upon reckless driving in violation of NRS 484.377, trial judge did not err in refusing to give requested jury instruction defining "speed contest" as used in that section because that term has no technical legal meaning and judge found it to be crystal clear and to need no further definition. Trial courts have broad discretion in deciding whether terms within jury instructions should be further defined and words which are used in jury instructions in their ordinary sense and which are commonly understood require no further defining instructions. Dawes v. State, 110 Nev. 1141, 881 P.2d 670 (1994), cited, Rossana v. State, 113 Nev. 375, at 383, 934 P.2d 1045 (1997)

Defendant charged with driving while under influence of intoxicating liquor was entitled to jury instruction on reckless driving as lesser-related offense under circumstances. While defendant was charged with driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor (see NRS 484.379), district court committed reversible error when it refused defendant's requested jury instruction on reckless driving (see NRS 484.377) as lesser-related offense because: (1) the offense of reckless driving was closely related to the offense of driving under the influence where the facts sufficiently reflected the aspect of recklessness that would support the finding of reckless driving; (2) the defense theory that defendant was not driving under the influence with a blood-alcohol content that was 0.10 percent or more was not inconsistent with a conviction for reckless driving; and (3) the fact that defendant had been drinking an alcoholic beverage while driving at a high rate of speed and that he had been driving with a revoked license constituted arguable basis for the finding of reckless driving. Further, a jury instruction for reckless driving as a lesser-related offense was warranted because the results of the breath test, which was the only evidence presented to prove that defendant's blood-alcohol content was 0.10 percent or more, had a margin of error which could have erroneously elevated defendant's blood-alcohol content to a level that was higher than 0.099 percent. (N.B., case decided before blood alcohol content (BAC) threshold lowered to 0.08 in 2003.) Johnson v. State, 111 Nev. 1210, 902 P.2d 48 (1995)

Access road constructed by a mining corporation on federal property did not constitute a "highway" under the circumstances. Where: (1) the defendant was charged with one count of reckless driving causing substantial bodily harm in violation of NRS 484.377 for an accident that occurred on an access road; (2) the access road was constructed by a mining corporation on federal property pursuant to a right-of-way granted by the Bureau of Land Management; and (3) the access road was open to the public for vehicular traffic, but was never dedicated to a public authority, the supreme court held that the access road was not a highway for the purposes of chapter 484 of NRS. The court noted that while NRS 484.377 does not limit its application to certain types of roads, NRS 484.777 provides that the provisions of chapter 484 of NRS apply uniformly on all highways. While NRS 484.065 defines the term "highway" to mean a road that is open to the public for vehicular traffic and dedicated to a public authority, a road does not become dedicated to a public authority simply because the public has access to it. Lee v. State, 116 Nev. 452, 997 P.2d 138 (2000)

Reckless driving is not a lesser included offense of murder. In a prosecution for murder (see NRS 200.010), where the defendant deliberately drove directly into the victim's motor vehicle which resulted in the victim's death, trial counsel was not deficient in failing to request a jury instruction on reckless driving causing substantial bodily harm (see NRS 484.377) because, as the elements of reckless driving are not entirely included within the elements of murder, reckless driving is not a lesser included offense of murder. Barton v. State, 117 Nev. 686, 30 P.3d 1103 (2001)